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Abstract— Providing communications during disaster relief 
continues to be a significant challenge.  Difficulties associated 
with communications between responders, disparate agencies and 
the outside world continue to plague disaster response efforts. 
Modern disaster response often requires the transmission of 
various information including text, voice, video and other types of 
data. One way of providing communications during disaster 
response is through the use of Hastily Formed Networks. Hastily 
Formed Networks are rapidly deployable ad hoc networks which 
can be generated using a variety of different technologies 
including 802.11 WiFi, 802.16 WiMAX, and VSAT. Early 
implementations of these ad hoc disaster networks were slow, 
primitive and unreliable. In the past, equipment needed to 
implement Hastily Formed Networks was expensive, cumbersome 
and in many cases only available to the military or large 
corporations. Today, many of these technologies are increasingly 
available and have matured to provide robust rapidly deployable 
networks.  In many cases these networks can provide 
interoperability between disparate agencies, provide crucial 
operational information and support real-time situational 
awareness.  This paper reviews recent advances in technologies 
associated with providing communications in extreme 
environments and summarizes practical requirements for 
implementing Hastily Formed Networks in disaster response 
environments. We also present a model applicable to 
communications in disaster response scenarios. Case studies from 
events such as Hurricane Katrina, the Haitian Earthquake and 
major exercises including Strong Angel and Urban Shield 
illustrate the evolution of these network technologies, inform 
lessons, and indicate directions for the future of emergency 
communications. 
Keywords-disruption tolerant networks; hastily formed 
networks;  information and communication technologies; 




Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) are portable IP-based 
networks which are deployed in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster when normal communications infrastructure has been 
degraded or destroyed.  Since HFNs create new 
communications infrastructure they can be very valuable in 
providing basic communications (voice/video/data) until pre-
disaster infrastructure can be restored. HFNs are a particularly 
effective implementation of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) enabling the crisis communications 
necessary for a rapid, efficient, humanitarian response.   
The high frequency of major global disasters in the past 
decade [1] have created a growing focus on the international 
response community‟s severe challenges associated with 
effectively communicating, coordinating and interoperating in 
a multi-national/multi-agency disaster relief operation. 
Communications have been identified as a key piece in 
coordinating the diverse organizations (military, government, 
NGO, industry, academic, volunteer, etc.) involved in 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) [2].    
With no communications, on scene responders and remote 
support agencies have no ability to share situational awareness, 
manage resource requests, coordinate personnel, or establish 
unified command and control. HFNs that enable 
communications infrastructure are therefore essential for a 
rapid and effective HA/DR response.  
There is extensive research on networks in extreme 
environments. These studies address disruption tolerant 
networks in extreme environments [3][4], public safety 
communications in harsh propagation areas [5], mobile 
networks in disasters [6][7], sensor networks in disasters [8],  
incomplete ad hoc wireless networks [9], mobile nodes in 
wireless networks [10], and sparse sensor networks [11]. 
However, despite this research, academia and the early 
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 response community have little knowledge of the real-world 
issues and the requirements for effective HFN deployment in 
disaster response. 
To fill this gap, this paper demonstrates the use of HFNs to 
support HA/DR. In specific we outline the ICT needed in 
disaster situations and review the recent evolution of HFNs. 
We present a model to address the new developments in 
technology, the increased demand for bandwidth, and the 
growing use of HFNs in large-scale disasters. The experience 
of two authors and case studies of major disasters and exercises 
is used to provide insight on relevant criteria for effective 
deployments.   
II. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IN 
DISASTERS 
For most types of disasters, at least for the first several days 
after the event, the communications infrastructure is often 
dramatically degraded.  Typically we find: 
 Minimal or no power 
 Degraded or overwhelmed telephony services 
 Degraded Push-To-Talk (PTT) radio communications  
 Minimal or no radio interoperability 
 Overwhelmed Satellite Phone (SatPhone) services  
 Not enough satellite equipment and/or oversubscribed 
services 
 Limited Internet access 
 Few information technology resources available 
The extent of communications degradation can be 
extensive. The affected area can be extremely large, spanning 
multiple nations (for example the 2004 Southeast Asian 
tsunami). The loss of communications can also be inconsistent. 
For example, during the 2010 Haitian Earthquake response, 
there were daily periodic blackouts of cellular communications.  
In the aftermath of the 2011 Japan earthquake, some volunteers 
had working Internet connections but no cellular phones while 
others had working cellular phones but no Internet.   
To address this unpredictable communications landscape, 
early responders must bring in their own ICT capabilities.  For 
rapid deployment in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, we 
find ICT should conform to the following constraints:  
 Small and lightweight. Disaster responders must often 
physically carry equipment into hard-to-access areas, 
requiring equipment to be portable.  
 Commercially available, non-military grade. Many 
responders are budget-constrained, making it is critical 
that communications equipment be easily obtained off-
the-shelf instead of military equipment that can be 
expensive and hard to obtain outside of government 
channels. 
 Energy independent. Power infrastructure may be 
significantly degraded, requiring early responders to 
supply their own power. Since generator fuel can be 
difficult to obtain in disaster zones, non-fossil fuel 
power generation can also be an important 
consideration. 
 Flexible. Disaster zone environments can change 
rapidly, and responders may need to adjust the 
capabilities to match the current needs. For example, 
systems that use 3G/4G cellular service and traditional 
Internet Service Providers will have greater flexibility.  
ICT capabilities must allow responders to communicate 
within the disaster zone, reach back to supporting organizations 
outside of the affected region, and interoperate with other 
responding agencies.  To operate most effectively and take 
advantage of the globally available resources requires phones, 
radios, Short Message Service (SMS), email, data sharing, 
access to incident management tools, Geographic Information 
System (GIS) information, social media and many other tools 
and applications. Many of these capabilities rely heavily on 
Internet access requiring responder agencies to supply their 
own Internet connectivity until pre-existing infrastructure is 
restored. This may require the following ICT: 
 Satellite connection to the Internet  
 Meshed Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) for wireless Internet 
coverage  
 Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
(WiMAX) to tie WiFi mesh networks together, connect 
to nearest surviving infrastructure, and share limited 
satellite services  
 Voice over IP (VoIP) technologies 
 Push-To-Talk radio equipment Ultra high Frequency/ 
Very High Frequency/High Frequency (UHF/VHF/HF)  
 Radio over IP (RoIP) equipment that facilitates radio 
interoperability 
 Standard Internet tools such as email, web access, and 
video to provide situational awareness and 
collaboration 
Additionally, there is a need for an ICT model to deploy an 
effective, stable, sustainable, portable, IP-based 
communications infrastructure.  In the following sections, we 
discuss an updated model of the Hastily Formed Network 
(HFN) to meet these needs.  
III. EVOLUTION OF HFNS: THE CHANGING FACE OF 
DISASTER RESPONSE 
While the basic concepts of HFNs have remained relatively 
constant over the last ten years, the capabilities of the 
components have significantly improved. Deployments in 
exercises such as Urban Shield and Strong Angel III [12] and 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina [13] and the 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake, have shown the effectiveness of HFNs in disaster 
response communications.  
The capacity of HFNs are greater, the components are 
smaller, more resilient, and affordable for more organizations. 
 Much of this equipment can now be 
purchased off-the-shelf by the average 
consumer allowing for more of it to be 
deployed. Improvements have been made 
in the effective deployment of high data 
high speed HFNs. Endpoint devices that 
connect to the HFN such as smart phones 
and tablet computers are increasingly 
available and used by responders [13].   
The growing use of HFNs has caused 
an increase in the development of data 
intensive applications driving the need for 
greater bandwidth as well as faster, more 
resilient systems. This trend continued in 
the wake of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake 
where open source disaster applications 
were written and deployed to responders 
in the first days of the response (for 
example Tradui [14]). 
With the advent of smartphones, 
laptops, tablet computing and cellular 
infrastructure, data-intensive technologies 
in disaster response are becoming more 
prevalent. The average person has rapid access to information 
and becomes a source of information as well as a consumer.  
Crowdsourced data is now becoming a major source of 
information sharing for first responders. For example, in the 
2010 Haitian Earthquake response, VoIP, video and 
applications like Skype, Ushahidi, Sahana, OpenStreetMaps, 
Facebook, Twitter, Google Maps, and many other social media 
and crowdsourced applications provided some of the 
communication and situational awareness for disaster 
responders [15].  
IV. A LAYERED HASTILY FORMED NETWORK (HFN) 
MODEL: PHYSICAL/NETWORK/APPLICATIONS AND 
HUMAN/SOCIAL  
The term “Hastily Formed Network” was coined at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School after Hurricane Katrina to describe 
impromptu networks that provide crisis communications [16]. 
Here we present a model of components and guidance for 
effective HFNs addressing the evolution of technologies, data-
intensive applications and social issues of disaster response, 
expanding on guidance provided by Denning [16]. The HFN 
Model “Fig. 1” consists of three main components Physical, 
Network, and Applications, with an overarching layer that 
takes into account the Human/Social aspects of disaster 
response. The model was originally articulated by Alderson 
and Steckler [17] derived from Steckler [13] [18] and describes 
the components of an HFN. The actual deployment and 








Figure 1.   The HFN Architecture Model 
A. Physical Layer: Power, Human Support Needs, Physical 
Security and Network Operations Center 
The Physical layer deals with the base level of what is 
required to build an HFN. Without these considerations, the 
layers above will not function.  
1) Power Sources 
HFN technology deployments require power. After a 
disaster, in many cases power normal power infrastructure has 
been degraded or destroyed requiring in responders to supply 
their own. One common power source is the generator. 
However, given the size and weight of these systems and the 
dependence on a reliable supply fossil fuel they can sometimes 
be a problem. Also airline regulations prohibit shipping of used 
generators due to explosion hazard. There are other power 
sources that do not require fossil fuel such as alternators, solar, 
wind, hand cranks or fuel cells, but they have their own set of 
requirements and limitations. A modified automobile alternator 
can be used, but these also require fossil fuel and availability of 
vehicles. Solar panels require sunlight and are not practical for 
heavy regular power demands. Portable micro-wind turbines 
require winds of about 25 knots or higher to function. Bicycle 
or hand cranking systems can provide a small amount power, 
however they require a human to crank them and are very 
inefficient power generation devices. Hydrogen fuel cells are 
still in progress in terms of cost, reliability and effectiveness 
and often require special fuel bottles. Solar, wind, cranks and 
fuel cells are often better used to charge batteries or to augment 
fossil fuel solutions, given the unreliable nature of wind, 
sunlight, fuel for fuel cells, and physical labor. Overall, it is 
advisable to have integrated multiple power options available.  
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 2) Human Support Needs 
It is essential to consider how the early responders will get 
food, water, shelter, fuel, hygiene, and medical care. Basic 
logistics can be some of the most challenging problems facing 
responders. Most responders deploy with at least some of these 
supplies but will need to procure more after their supplies run 
out. This can be difficult as local resources are often already at 
a premium. Frequently supplies must be shipped in from the 
outside, requiring transportation logistics, customs approval, 
compliance with local government regulations, and a number 
of other problems that can delay their arrival.  Medical 
resources are often limited and at a high demand especially if 
the disaster has caused significant casualties, hazardous 
materials contamination, disease outbreaks such as cholera, or 
other problems such as the release of radiation in the 2011 
Japan earthquake. 
3) Physical Security 
One of the most important aspects to consider is physical 
security. This includes security of the personnel, equipment, 
and the facilities. For example in Haiti, some medical teams 
were forced to leave the area due to security concerns [19] and 
many food distributors were concerned with riots [20]. 
4) Network Operation Center 
The network operations center (NOC) is a central part of 
any HFN, whether it is in a local building, mobile command 
unit, or tent. Since providing a communications network is the 
primary mission of an HFN it is critical to protect it as much as 
possible. There are several considerations that must be 
addressed including managing the limited and expensive 
bandwidth, securing the network, and wireless or other radio 
frequency (RF) interference problems. Managing the RF 
spectrum in a disaster can be challenging especially if the local 
government is not sophisticated enough to manage the RF 
environment. Sometimes, ad hoc agreements emerge between 
the various early responders or a combination of the UN 
Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), the 
international military‟s Joint or Combined Task Force, and the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) work together 
to manage the RF spectrum. 
B. Network Layer: Wired, wireless local network, wireless 
long haul network and satellite broadband connection to 
the Internet 
The network layer provides the backbone of the 
communications system. There are a number of technologies 
that can be used to create the network and the best choice 
depends on the requirements of the situation. There are three 
main technologies used to create the network: WiMAX, 
Meshed WiFi, and Satellite.  Below are the basic descriptions 
of each type of technology.  
1) WiMAX 
WiMAX also known as IEEE 802.16 is a terrestrial 
broadband point-to-point or point-to-multipoint wireless bridge 
technology. A key distinction is that it is a bridging technology.  
WiMAX works well because it is inexpensive, easy to deploy, 
reliable, has a range up to 50 miles, high throughput 54 
megabits (Mbps) per second, and is readily available. The most 
common frequencies are non-licensed 5.8 and 2.4 gigahertz 
(GHz), though some new products are emerging in the licensed 
3.5 to 5.0 GHz range. WiMAX antennas should be as high as 
possible as WiMAX is a “line of sight” technology.  WiMAX 
is typically deployed side-by-side with satellite 
communications and Meshed WiFi is most useful in a 
hub/spoke configuration. It is often used to provide connection 
from disaster zone to the nearest surviving telecommunications 
infrastructure. 
2) Satellite-based Internet access 
Satellite communications (SATCOM) provides the ability 
to connect to the Internet when the normal terrestrial 
infrastructure is degraded or destroyed. SATCOM can be 
rapidly deployed in under an hour.  While satellite service is 
costly compared to other typical methods of Internet access, in 
a disaster environment the use of satellites may be the only 
available option. 
The most common types of portable satellite are VSATs 
(Very Small Aperture Terminal) which range from 1-3 meter 
terminals and BGANs (Broadband Global Area Network) 
which are the size of a laptop.  Newer systems are packaged in 
one or two transit cases each weighing less than 100 pounds. 
For example the GATR system is inflatable giving it a very 
small and light form factor. Satellite terminals can be deployed 
anywhere they have a clear line of site to the service provider‟s 
satellites.   
Satellite communications provide Internet access speeds 
ranging from 128 kilobits per second (kbps) to 30 Mbps and 
the typical frequencies are X, C, Ku, Ka and L bands.  
Some issues with satellites include “rain fade”, where 
satellite service can be temporarily degraded by a significant 
storm either over the end-user ground terminal or over the 
provider‟s earth station. Also the use of too many terminals in 
one area can often saturate the existing service capacity causing 
service degradation.   
Because of the long distance round-trips involved in 
geosynchronous satellite communications, latency and jitter 
can affect the network performance for certain timing-sensitive 
applications such as voice and video.  Modern Quality-of-
Service (QoS) algorithms are able to mostly compensate for 
these issues, enabling VoIP and videoconferencing applications 
to be used effectively by end-users. 
3) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)/Meshed WiFi 
WiFi (also known as IEEE 802.11) access points can be 
deployed to create a WLAN that provides Internet access for 
mobile devices like laptops, wireless phones, or remote 
sensors. They typically provide speeds of 10-100 Mbps. 
This WLAN can be extended by strategically positioning 
multiple wireless access points (WAPs) into a unified network 
that can increase the footprint of the wireless network up to 
several square miles. 
Once a meshed WiFi WLAN is established it provides a 
seamless hand off from WAP to WAP allowing clients to move 
transparently within the mesh while maintaining connectivity.  
 C. Application Layer: Information Dissemination, 
Integration, Collaboration 
Once established, the HFN becomes the backbone for 
various critical applications. In the early days of HFNs, these 
applications were mostly text based like email, basic web 
access, file transfer, and chat programs. As these technologies 
matured, VoIP has become increasingly important since it can 
operate across the HFN and not rely on pre-existing 
infrastructure. 
Traditional Push-to-talk (PTT) radio systems such as UHF, 
VHF and HF have always been and still are a critical part of 
HA/DR.  However one of the biggest challenges is that each 
response agency may bring in their own radio systems that may 
not be interoperable with other agencies radio systems.  With 
the advent of IP, radio technology has adapted to leverage the 
Internet with Radio over IP (RoIP). Systems such as Cisco 
IPICS, Twisted Pair WAVE or SyTech RIOS, are used to 
integrate different radio systems with each other as well as 
cellular, satellite phones, or VoIP systems. This allows 
collaboration between local communications systems and to 
outside systems via the Internet.  
With the recent explosion of smartphones, tablets and small 
cameras, as well as the need for greater situational awareness, 
demand for video, GIS, collaboration and Incident 
Management portals tools is increasing. Video streaming and 
video teleconferencing is enhancing traditional radio and phone 
communications. Supporting these new demands can create 
challenges for HFNs.  The bandwidth required for voice and 
video is much greater than text-based systems and it must be 
stable and continuously available.  
The demand for GIS tools has also increased. The greater 
the understanding of the local terrain and the hazards created 
by a disaster, the more effective responders can be. However, 
GIS data can also strain an HFN, requiring the transfer of 
extremely large amounts of mapping data. GIS and layered 
mapping tools such as Google Earth Pro, GeoFusion, 
OpenStreetMap, and ArcGIS, are becoming more popular and 
by partnering with social network applications they can be 
populated with real-time crowdsourced information; this was 
valuable to responders, especially in the 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake response [21].   
Internet access has increased due to the use of desktop and 
collaboration tools such as Cisco WebEx, or Microsoft 
SharePoint.  Internet access has also increased the use of web 
portals and incident management tools specializing in complex 
disaster management such as resource tracking, missing 
persons, shelters and volunteer management. Some of these 
include the United Nations ReliefWeb and Virtual On-Site 
Operations Center (VOSOCC), Sahana, the U.S. military‟s All 
Partners Access Network (APAN) or various commercial 
applications.  
D. Human Cognitive Layer: Social/Cultural, Organizational, 
Political, Economic 
As HFNs matured, it became clear that in addition to all of 
the physical network infrastructure there was a need for a 
separate layer in the “soft science” human/cognitive realm. The 
effectiveness of an HFN depends on human components [14]. 
Some believe this human element is the more challenging part 
of HFN deployment. 
The Human Cognitive layer consists of four key 
components; organizational, economic, political and 
social/cultural which are discussed below. Issues in these areas 
can limit the effectiveness of an ICT deployment. In many 
cases there are currently no easy solutions or international 
standards to address these challenges. We see this area as a key 
focus for future work in the HA/DR community. 
1) Organizational 
 Unity of effort but no unity of command can often 
cause agencies to interfere with each other and with 
normal government/business operations.  There are no 
clear standards as to who should be “in charge” for 
reconstituting the overall communication 
infrastructure.  
 Lack of interoperability between PTT radio systems 
causes confusion and wasted resources when disparate 
agencies cannot coordinate their response. This directly 
affects a key element of any successful disaster 
response which is information sharing.   
 Transitioning from emergency ICT to recovery ICT 
requires a process for migrating from temporary ICT to 
a phase that rebuilds the permanent ICT infrastructure.  
2) Economic 
 The cost and availability of ICT infrastructure, in 
particular satellite service, can be too expensive for 
some organizations. 
 ICT equipment brought in by early responders can be 
viewed as competition by local service providers.  This 
can often interfere with the ability to help support a 
disaster effectively. 
 Many communities and early response organizations 
have not pre-established contracts to obtain equipment, 
technical personnel and services in the event of a 
disaster. This can cause critical services and equipment 
to be unavailable when they are most needed.  
3) Political 
 Government rules and regulations around ICT can be 
challenging.  This can include RF licensing issues as 
well as discouraging use of VoIP because it is 
perceived as a threat to established telephone carriers. 
For example, during the 2011 Japan Earthquake 
response, the government limited the use of C and Ku 
band satellites, forcing responders to use the slow and 
oversubscribed L band BGANs. This in turn 
minimized the support responders were able to 
provide to the affected communities. 
 Customs can delay equipment and supplies so long 
that by the time it clears, the acute phase of the 
emergency for which it was needed is over.  
 Use of telecommunication equipment by humanitarian 
organizations is often impeded by regulatory barriers 
that make it difficult to use without prior consent of 
 the local authorities. The Tampere Convention [22] is 
an example of nation states working together to 
improve communications related HA/DR issues. 
 The ability to deploy HA/DR technologies in conflict 
or wartime environments can be extremely challenging 
and dangerous reducing the amount of support 
responders are able to provide. 
4) Social/Cultural 
The immediate aftermath of a disaster typically brings 
numerous international responder agencies. Often these early 
responders have difficulty working with others, due to biases, 
differences in culture, language, or sponsors.  
 Some organizations are reluctant to work with other 
organizations because of a perceived conflict of 
interest that may affect their status as neutral parties, or 
they may fear ramifications involving the comfort level 
of donors to contribute. 
 Organizations with different operating structures such 
as a very rigid top down command structure can have 
friction with organizations that have a more consensus 
driven operating model.  
 Existing humanitarian organizations that may have 
been operating in the region before a disaster can 
perceive the arrival of disaster responders as disrupting 
the status quo.  
 Technologists often do not understand first responder 
processes and procedures. In the United States, these 
issues are addressed through the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) [23] and Incident 
Command System (ICS), but analogous systems often 
do not exist in international emergency responses. 
 New technologies can require a learning curve. Many 
early responders are uncomfortable using an unfamiliar 
system.   
V. HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS IN ACTION 
The HFN model above describes critical components of 
HFNs needed in modern disaster response. Below we describe 
two specific deployments of HFNs that enabled high 
performance communication in a major disaster (the 2010 
Haitian Earthquake) and a major exercise (Urban Shield). 
A. Haiti Case Study: HFN Enabled Social Networking 
Applications Transform Disaster Response  
On Tuesday January 2010 at 21:53 UTC, a catastrophic 7.0 
magnitude earthquake hit Haiti. The earthquake caused major 
damage in Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and other settlements in the 
region. An estimated three million people were affected by the 
quake [24]. The Haitian government reported that an estimated 
316,000 people had died, 300,000 had been injured and 
1,000,000 made homeless [25][26]. 
Infrastructure for communications, transport facilities and 
power were severely damaged by the earthquake. The public 
telephone system was not available and all of Haiti‟s cellular 
phone providers were affected. Fiber optic and microwave 
connectivity to the outside world was disrupted. These 
degraded communications severely hampered early relief 
efforts throughout Haiti. 
Standard HFN technologies were deployed by several 
disaster response agencies all over of Port-au-Prince and the 
surrounding areas to provide communications. Cisco Tactical 
Operations (TacOps) spent three months in Haiti supporting 
twenty-five agencies including urban-search-and-rescue 
(USAR), government, NGO and military organizations.  
TacOps deployed much needed networking equipment 
including routers, switches, hundreds of IP phones, VSAT, 
BGANs, and portable network kits with voice, data and 
wireless capabilities. The team worked with local service 
providers to rebuild damaged infrastructure including setting 
up WiMAX links to provide temporary connectivity until the 
fiber connections could be repaired.  The team also provided 
HFNs with VoIP for the U.S. military and provided wireless 
bridging between buildings for NGOs [27]. They also installed 
a video conferencing system for the Haitian Government.  
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) also spent three 
months in Haiti deploying HFNs for the U.S. military. The 
team first deployed to the USNS COMFORT hospital ship, 
then started deploying HFNs via helicopter from the USNS 
COMFORT to the U.S. Embassy, the Port-au-Prince port 
facility, several boat/helicopter landing zones, and out to the 
NGO community. They were able to help hospitals 
communicate with the USNS COMFORT and the U.S. 
Embassy for medical evacuations. The NPS team conducted 
ICT assessments for the Joint Task Force Haiti 
Communications Manager (“J6”), helped the Haitian 
Government with frequency assignments, documented how the 
NGO community was providing health care and studied how 
the various militaries, the United Nations and NGOs operating 
in Haiti were interacting and sharing information. 
The HFNs deployed in Haiti were distinct from prior 
disaster deployments because of the high volume and type of 
data carried over the communication networks. Haiti was the 
first all-encompassing test of a predominantly data driven 
response, due to the fact that much of the usual terrestrial 
telecommunications infrastructure did not exist and responders 
had no other option than to use IP-based communications as 
the core of the response. Most previous disasters were driven 
more by legacy communications such as telephones and radios.  
In Haiti, as far as disaster response and the use of new or 
existing technologies there was a previously unmatched use of 
the Internet and social networking applications to provide 
rescues, coordination on the ground [28], situational awareness, 
GIS information, crowdsourced information and more. Twitter 
and Facebook were overloaded with messages asking for help 
[29]. The American Red Cross set a record for mobile 
donations, raising U.S. $7 million in 24 hours by enabling the 
general public to send $10 donations by text messages [30]. 
OpenStreetMap greatly improved the level of mapping 
available using post-earthquake satellite photography from 
GeoEye [31], as well as partnering with Walking Papers to 
scan in hand drawn local information about the disaster [32]. 
Google Earth updated its maps to show “clickable” layers of 
 real-time disaster information on top of the GIS imagery and 
many more. One of the more notable uses of social media in 
Haiti was using SMS messages to help locate and/or rescue 
victims. A collaborative effort including Ushahidi, InSTEDD, 
DigiCel, Crowdflower, Samasource and a host of others 
produced a system where Haitians could use the SMS short 
code 4636 to send messages about injuries, about people 
trapped under rubble or reports of missing people[15][33]. 
Their messages were automatically uploaded to a database 
where volunteers around the world translated, geolocated and 
categorized the messages via online crowdsourcing platforms 
which sorted the information by need and priority, and 
distributed it to various emergency responders and aid 
organizations [33][34].  
These examples have shown the growth and benefit of 
social networking and other data-driven applications in 
assisting the 2010 Haitian Earthquake response.  
B. Urban Shield Case Study: HFN Enables Video 
Conferencing to Improve Exercise Communications 
Urban Shield is one of the United States‟ largest multi-
national, multi-jurisdictional full-scale disaster response 
exercises. On October 15-18 2010, 3000+ responders 
participated simultaneously in 40+ exercises over a geographic 
area of 700 square miles, nine counties [35], simulating the 
response to a major disaster in the San Francisco Bay area. To 
facilitate coordination and communication among a large 
number of agencies and to 
create a testing environment 
for new technologies, one of 
the authors (C. Nelson) 
designed, built, deployed and 
maintained an HFN which 
provided a private secure 
network for communication 
among a Primary Command 
and Control site, six Area 
Commands and 26 Site 
commands [37].  The network 
enabled video conferencing, 
video surveillance, voice 
communications and wireless 
internet connectivity around 
each site, as well as 
established a test-bed for 
disaster applications. This 
system was deployed 
alongside the traditional 
public safety radio systems in 
order to enhance 
communications via voice, 
video and data.  
The HFN “Fig 2” was 
created by deploying six 
Emergency Communications Kits (ECKs), using Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSEC) Virtual Private Network (VPN) to 
communicate back to the main hub at the Primary Command 
and Control Center.  ECKs are a portable self-contained IP-
based communications unit in a ruggedized shock-mounted 
rack case [37]. They contain a Cisco  Integrated Services 
Router (ISR) series router, Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) 3500 
series PoE switch, wired 7900 series phones, wireless 7900 
series IP phones, 802.11 wireless 1200 series access points, and 
an uninterruptable power supply (UPS). ECKs can use many 
types of transport to connect to the network including terrestrial 
Internet, BGAN/ VSAT and cellular data. Video conferencing 
systems of differing capabilities were connected to the network 
ranging from high-end high-definition video systems to low-
end laptop cameras, allowing site commanders to either make 
point-to-point calls, or point-to-multipoint calls, creating an 
exercise wide conference call. The video system was smart 
enough to allow each video stream to be “tuned” to take 
advantage of the available bandwidth enabling the high latency 
and low bandwidth situations usually found in disaster 
response networks to be mitigated with minimal effects to the 
video conference quality.  
Lessons learned from previous HFN deployments such as 
Strong Angel III and Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that it is 
critical for maintaining functionality to protect limited network 
bandwidth and monitor the overall health of the network. A 
combination of firewall rules, Quality of Service (QoS), Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) based Network 
Management System (NMS), Cisco NetFlow, and other device 
monitoring technologies were set in place to monitor network 
traffic and alert Information Technology (IT) staff when any 
anomalies occurred.  
Figure 2.  Urban Shield hub and spoke network map 
1) Results of Urban Shield HFN 
This was the first time video conferencing had been used in 
an Urban Shield exercise. It enhanced situational awareness 
 and operational efficiency by allowing several hundred people 
to be joined into a single video call within a matter of minutes.  
In prior years, it took over 30 minutes to coordinate all sites 
together on the same phone call. The new technology required 
some adjustment as first responders did have to be educated on 
video conference etiquette.  These issues were minor and users 
rapidly adjusted to the new system. The speed of information 
dissemination provided by video conferencing over HFN was a 
dramatic improvement for many responders. Remarks such as 
“Command staff here definitely feels that briefings over video 
are more effective than the conference calls last year”, 
validated the usefulness of the HFN supporting a large multi-
site exercise. The HFN architecture and components performed 
well [38]. The video units allowed for tuning of devices on a 
lower bandwidth to get the best experience without impacting 
the quality of devices connecting over higher bandwidth. The 
usefulness of the ECKs at different bandwidths including 
satellite-based networks with high latency and low bandwidth 
was confirmed. The ease of set up and tear down of the 
network points was validated. At one point a site needed to 
relocate, and the non-technical staff was able to disconnect the 
system, move it and reconnect with no problems. IPSEC 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology created secure 
tunnels that protected sensitive information. And, the network 
management tools demonstrated their importance by protecting 
the network when test software began flooding the network 
with TCP SYN (synchronize/start) packets. The anomaly was 
detected by the NMS software and rate-limiting was put in 
place to protect the core network. Overall the system operated 
effectively, provided enhanced communications, was secure 
and well accepted by the first responders.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Hastily Formed Networks provide great benefit to HA/DR 
response by tying together critical ICT components to provide 
the breadth of communications needed in complex 
emergencies. In light of the evolving requirements of end-users 
for greater access to data, we have presented a descriptive HFN 
model that has demonstrated tremendous benefit for HA/DR 
responders in multiple real-world deployments. Key challenges 
remain in the Human/Social domain, and should be a focus 
area for future work by the HA/DR community. 
We believe that response agencies should consider ICT as a 
primary service in HA/DR as essential as food, water, shelter 
and medical care.  Therefore agencies must plan for future 
investment in ICT.  Governments, NGOs and other 
humanitarian agencies should continue work to establish 
international standards around complex, multi-agency disaster 
operations to enable a more cohesive response. Agencies also 
need to test and train with technology regularly to ensure 
personnel are practiced and able to use it effectively.  
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